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Summary  findings
Many developing and industrial countries have sought to  contracts and designing power markets to reduce
open their electricity industries to competition.  In both  rigidities and incentivize IPPs to participate more fully in
con-exts, policymakers and investors have to deal with  wholesale power markets and to take on greater market
the consequences of earlier, more partial sector  risk. The authors conclude that forced market
liberalization measures. Foremost among these is the  integration or forced contract negotiation have failed and
existence of long-term contracts with independent power  are counterproductive.  Conversely, in countries where
producers (IPPs).  The long-term nature of these contracts  IPPs provide a sizable proportion  of generation capacity,
has complicated the introduction  of more far-reaching  ignoring market integration may result in insufficient
sectoral reform designed to harness competitive market  market liquidity and discourage new entry, attenuating
forces for the benefit of consumers.  the scope for market forces to act for the benefit of
In developing countries, introducing competition is  consumers. Failure to adapt power purchase contracts
often coupled with breaking up and privatizing state-  and market rules imposes huge resource costs on the
owned electricity monopolies. In this context, discussion  economy beyond the financial obligations consumers and
of renegotiation of power purchase agreements has  taxpayers must bear.
tended toward the polemical. At one end are those who  Based on recent experience, a combination of
resist any change, arguing that the "sanctity of contracts"  measures, including adaptation of specific market rules,
precludes modification of contract terms. At the other  contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity,
end are those who favor governments taking coercive  contract  buyout provisions, transitional financing
measures to modify existing contracts in the name of  mechanisms, and characteristics of the successor entity to
maximizing economic welfare and minimizing the  the power purchaser, offer promising approaches for
burden of sector reform on consumers and on the state.  reconciling preexisting IPP contracts with new market
Drawing on recent country experiences, Woolf and  structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market
Halpern analyze alternative approaches to restructuring  costs associated with such contracts.
This paper-a  joint product of the Water and Sanitation Unit, Energy and Water Department, and the Finance, Private
Sectiar,  and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to
evaluate  and  disseminate  lessons of  experience  in  designing policies  to  improve  the  quality  and  sustainability  of
infrastructure services. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
204.33. Please contact the energy help desk, room F4K-190, telephone 202-473-0652,  fax 202-522-3228,  email address
energyhelpdesk  @  worldbank.org. Policy  Research  Working Papers are also  posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.
The authors may be contacted at fiona.woolfCa@cmck.com  or jhalpern@worldbank.org.  November 2001.  (37 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Senes dissebinates  the findings  of work in progress  to encotirage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development issues.  An objectiv e of the series is to get the findings out quickly, e7ven  if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry)  the names of the authors and shouild be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of  the authors.  Thev do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executisve  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterIntegrating  Independent  Power  Producers  into
Emerging  Wholesale  Power Markets
Fiona WoollY
Jonathan  Halpern**
*  CMS  Cameron  McKenna,  London,  UK
**  Private  Sector  and Infrastructure  Vice  Presidency,  Energy  and  Water  Departmnent,  World  BankIntroduction
There has been considerable activity by both  developed and less developed countries to
reform  their electricity industries.  The developed countries are typically  motivated by a
desire  to  put  a  downward pressure  on  costs  and  prices whereas  the  less  developed
countries often  also have  the  overriding objective of mobilizing investment  financing,
improving  the  quantity  and  quality of  service, and  extending service  to  a  sizeable
proportion of the populace. Both types of countries face a number of common challenges.
One  of the  key issues is how to  deal effectively with pre-existing long term contracts,
notably, power purchase agreements (PPAs) with independent power producers (IPPs),
and their effect on  the reform, particularly where wholesale electricity  markets are being
introduced to enable competitive forces to act for the benefit of consumers.
Only  a  very  few  countries  that  have  implemented  or  are  planning  power  sector
restructuring have tried seriously  to address the integration or reconciliation  of existing  IPP
contracts with new market structures (notably, the Province of Ontario (Canada), Mexico,
the State of Victoria (Australia),  California, Thailand, Northern Ireland and Portugal).
This paper discusses:
e  policy goals, the means of achieving  them through IPP programs and wholesale power
markets, and the challenges  in integrating existing IPP contracts into new power market
arrangements.
*  Approaches to reconciling  existing IPP contracts with emerging  power markets.
*  Designing new IPP contracts better to  facilitate subsequent integration into electricity
markets.
Specific considerations relating to IPP contracts and their impact on power sector reforms
include (1) the choice of successor power purchaser or contract holder, and (2) quantifying
and recovering above-market costs.
This  paper  identifies  several approaches  that  can  be  employed, both  singly  or  in
combination, to restructure contracts and design power markets in a manner that reduces
rigidities and incentivizes IPPs to participate in wholesale power markets or to enter into
contracts under which they accept market risk.  The payoff to the country involved is the
realization of significant gains in productive  and  allocative efficiency.  If IPPs  are not
integrated into new markets, the scope for competition will be attenuated, new entry will
be deterred, and the county will incur large resource costs if plants are dispatched out of
the  merit  order.  The  specter  of  incurring very  large  economic  losses is  particularly
prominent in smaller economies where a significant proportion  of the thermal generating
base is comprised of IPPs and where the scope for effective horizontal de- integration and
market liquidity  is more limited. This issue needs to be addressed rather than avoided and
it is encouraging that  there are several approaches which  can be  adopted  to  achieve a
satisfactory  outcome.
2Background  and Context
Objectives  ofPower  Sector  Reform  Initiatives
A  growing  number  of  countries,  both  developing  and  developed,  have  reformed  and
liberalized  their  electricity industries  by introducing  wholesale  and, to a lesser degree,  retail
competition.  In  developing  countries,  the principal  objective has  typically been  to mobilize
private  investment  as efficiently  and  quickly as possible  to meet  rapid growth  in electricity
demand  and  to improve  both  the efficiency and  quality of service.  In  developed  countries,
the main goal has been  to keep downward  pressure  on costs  and prices as well as increasing
efficiency  through  the  capture  of  competitive  market  forces.  In  both  contexts,  policy
makers,  investors  and  industry  participants  have  had  to  deal with  consequences  of  prior,
more  partial  sector  liberalization  measures,  foremost  among  these  being  long  term
contracts  with independent  power producers  (IPPs).
Approaches  to Sector  Reform
The  1980s and  early  1990s saw two  different  approaches  to  reform  and  liberalization.  In
the  1980s,  the key issue was how  to meet  forecast  demand  growth  in industrialized  as well
as developing  countriesk  The  overriding  policy priority  was to quickly mobilize  funds  to
build  the  additional  generation  capacity.  In  several  countries,  there  was  also  a  move  to
diversify ownership  or  to minimize  the  use  of  further  public  sector  funding  or  borrowing
for the  purpose.  This resulted  in a wave  of  independent  power  producer  (IPP)  programs
being  put in place which  lasted well into the  1990s.
In  the  1990s  the  focus  shifted  somewhat  toward  realizing  greater  efficiencies  and
improving  financial viability so that  the industry  could  become  economically  self-sufficient
without  placing  unnecessary  demands  on  national  exchequer  or  consumers.  It  was
expected  that  greater  efficiencies  and  a  downward  pressure  on  prices  could  be  achieved
through  the  introduction  of  competition  and  incentive  regulation  as well  as privatization.
This was to result in a reallocation  of risks among  market  participants  with  the  overall goal
of incentivizing  efficient  behaviour.
Countries  where  there  was a  serious  generating  capacity  shortfall  such  as  the  Philippines,
Pakistan,  Indonesia  and  India  were  not  the  only  countries  to  pursue  IPP  programs.  A
number  of  Latin  American  countries  (including  Chile)  encouraged  IPP  plant  to  be
constructed.  Both  large and  small IPP  plant  was constructed  in the  US2 and  Canada  and
major  project  financings  of  power  stations  took  place  across  Europe  and  into  Turkey  as
well as in North  Africa.3
I  Several  developed  countries  forecast  demand  growth  at a level that  was never  realized,  and constructed
generating  plant  (e.g. oil-fired,  nuclear)  to  meet it.  They were  inevitably  left with  surplus  capacity  that  gives
rise to  unrecoverable  (stranded)  costs  when  competitive  wholesale  markets  are introduced.
2 Both  IPP and  QF  (quaiifying  facilities built  under  the  US Public  Utility Regulatory  Policies  Act  of  1978)
plant  have  been  built in the  U.S.
3 Although  long  term  IPP  contracts  may appear  incompatible  with  later,  more  extensive  reforms,  viewed  with
the  benefit  of hindsight,  they  may have  been  justified  at the time.  They  represented  a least-disturbance
approach  with  the  potential  for  the  quickest  potential  gains  or improvements.  There  was also  considerable
private  sector  enthusiasm  for  carrying  out  the  projects  which,  given  the  lack of prior  private  sector  investment
in  many  of those  countries,  would  not  have  occurred  absent  the security  of  a long-term  PPA.
3Regulatory  innovations  in  the  gas  and  telecoms  sectors,  particularly  moves  to  unbundle
services,  "deregulate"  trading  arrangements,  and  introduce  competition  through  third
party  access  to  networks,  began  to  influence  the  thinking  on  electricity.  As  a  result,
attention  shifted to reform  of the entire sector
Some  countries  focused  on  wholesale  competition  on  the  basis  that  generation  costs
accounted  for the largest  component  of the  cost  of  service to consumers.  They tended  to
choose  the  single buyer  model  (typically in smaller  or  developing  countries),  a mandatory
power  pool  or  a  competitive  market  consisting  of  bilateral  contracts  and  a  centrally
organized  spot  or  balancing  market.  Some  countries  opted  to  introduce  customer  choice
or retail competition  and  have  done  so on a phased-in  approach5, while  others  adopted  an
"all at once"  approach6
These  reform  strategies  inevitably  raise  the  question  as  to  the  treatment  of  existing  IPP
contracts.  In  developing  countries  in particular,  the  lack of  creditworthiness  of the  power
purchasers/contract  holders  (often supported  by government  guarantees)  focused  attention
on  where  the  money  was going  to come  from  to pay  the  IPPs  over  the  lengthy  contract
term.  As  a  result,  strategic  attention  was  turned  to  the  reform  of  the  power
purchaser/contract  holder  in  an  effort  to  improve  revenue  realization,  efficiencies,  and
quality  of  service  to  consumers.  This  prompted  the  unbundling  and  privatization  of
distribution  companies  in a number  of countries.
These  initiatives  involved  either  the  creation  or  overhaul  of  existing  regulatory
arrangements.  In  effect,  "de-regulation"  has involved  "re-regulation".  As  a  result, it has
not  simply been  central  government  agencies  implementing  the reform  strategies that  have
looked  at existing IPP  contracts.  Regulators  have also intervened,  in some  cases in order to
uphold  the  sanctity  of  contracts7 and  in  others,  to  force  or  encourage  renegotiation  in an
effort  to promote  competition.
The Nature  of IPP Contracts
Although  the  most  aggressive  of  the  IPP8 programs  were  put  in place  in countries  where
there  was  significant  capacity  shortfall,  IPPs  are  also present  in  countries  where  there  is a
capacity  surplus.  For example,  significant  numbers  of  IPPs  (and qualifying  facilities (QFs )
under  PURPA9) exist in the US.  Similarly, there  are roughly  100 IPPs  in Ontario,  Canada.
Some  of  these  were  the  result  of  legislative or  regulatory  fiat, designed  to  encourage  the
development  of  smaller  plant  using  renewable  fuel  sources  or  to  diversify investment  and
ownership  in the  sector.
The  construction  of  the  IPP  plant  was  usually  project  financed.  The  revenue  earning
ability of  the projects  was dependent  upon  a 25/30  year power  purchase  agreement  (PPA),
sometimes,  but  by no  means  always, awarded via a competitive  procurement  process.  The
PPAs  were  entered  into  with  a  single  buyer,  typically  a  vertically  integrated  utility  with
4 By  the entire  sector  we include  generation,  transmnission,  distribution  and retail  sales.
5 Most  European  countries  have chosen  to phase  in retail  competition,  starting  with  giving  customer  choice  to
large  industrial  consumers.
6 California  and Ontario  have  chosen  to introduce  customer  choice  for all  consumers.
7 For example,  in the US,  FERC encouraged  integration  and renegotiation  in the gas  industry  liberalization
but, as a result  of critcism of this  policy,  it upheld  sanctity  of existing  contracts  in the electricity  industry.
8 For the purpose  of this paper,  an IPP is defined  as an independent  power  producer  rather  than independent
power  project.
9  The US  Public  Utility  Regulatory  Policies  Act of 1978
4captive  retail  customers.  They  reflected  a  virtual  take-or-pay  regimelo, built  around  the
expected  debt  repayment  schedule and  the  requirements  of the  equity investors,  indexed  to
compensate  for inflation.  While  these  contracts,now  appear  to be  inflexible  it would  be  a
mistake  to conclude  that  they were unnecessary."
Most  of  the  PPAs  that were  concluded  in  the  early era of IPP  programs  were  based  on  a
US model  which  did not  reflect  the  fact  that  the  capacity  of  the  IPP  plant  might  be  very
significant  by comparison  to the total capacity  on the  system and  that  the power  purchaser
was,  typically, performing  two roles,  one  as the wholesale  buyer  of energy  for sale to retail
customers  and  the  other  as  system  operator  responsible  for  maintaining  reliability  and
security  of  supply.  The  IPP  may  or  may  not  have  been  dispatchable  with  respect  to  its
energy  production  but  it  was  usually  not  required  to  provide  ancillary  services  or  to
participate  in congestion  management  measures.
The  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  ancillary  service  varies  around  the  world.  For  the
purposes  of  this paper  the term  refers  to those  services required  by the  system  operator  to
maintain  system security or reliability.  This  may include  reactive power,  frequency  control
(AGC),  certain  types  of  reserve  and  black  start  capability.  Some  PPAs  and  some  Grid
Codes  or  technical  rules oblige generators  to provide  certain  services  as a matter  of course,
free  of  charge.  There  has  however  been  a  trend  towards  the  creation  of  markets  in
ancillary  services  in  order  to  incentivize  generators  to  provide  them  more  efficiently.
Despite  the  payments  involved,  the  overall  effect  of  the  market  treatment  of  ancillary
services  has been  to reduce the  costs of maintaining  system reliability.  Paradoxically,  where
obligations  to provide  ancillary services are imposed  under  PPAs, Grid  Codes  or  technical
rules  without  payment,  generators  will have  to  comply.  As  there  are  few  penalties  for
failing  to  do  so,  these  mandatory  rules  have  not  always  proved  effective  in  improving
discipline and minimizing  costs.  12
The  early  1990s  saw  the  creation  of  a  mechanism  for  remunerating  plant  that  was
dispatchable  rather  than  base  load,  largely  through  a  two  part  tariff  involving  separate
capacity  and  energy  payments  and  more  detailed  operational  rules. 13  The  European  PPA
10  The early  PPA contained  a single  part energy  charge. The  later  PPAs moved  to a two  part capacity  charge
(largely  covering  fixed  costs)  and energy  charge  (largely  covering  variable  costs). Although  the capacity  charge
was  designed  to make  IPPs indifferent  as to whether  their plant  was  dispatched  or not, it was  often  the case
that the energy  charge  reflected  a significant  profit which  meant that IPPs  were keen  to ensure  that their plant
was  nevertheless  dipatched  as base  load plant.
11  In the US,  prior to the enactment  of PURPA  in 1978,  there  was  virtually  no generating  plant  which  was  not
owned  by a vertically  integrated  monopoly  utility  (indeed,  the Public  Utility  Holding  Company  Act of 1935
made  such  independent  generation  virtually  impossible).  Moreover,  the PPAs  which resulted  were hardly  the
product  of bargaining  between  equals. Utilities  bought  power  only  because  they  were required  to and state
regulators  often  drafted  part of the contracts  to enforce  that obligation.
In addition,  the first  generation  of QFs were financed  on a 20/80 equity/debt  ratio,  which  meant lenders
required  a guaranteed  income  stream  to pay off the debt. In the 1980's  when  most QFs  were under
development  (but  far fewer  were operational),  every  attempt  by a utility  to avoid  its purchase  obligation
increased  the nervousness  of lenders  and added  new  inflexibility  into  financable  contracts.
12 In the 1980s,  when a significant  number  of QFs became  operational,  there was  no separate  market  for
ancillary  services;  indeed,  the purchasing  utility  itself  was  required  by  law to provide  ancillary  services  to the
QF, including  standby  power  and black  start  capability.  Many  QF contracts  did require  QFs to provide  VAR
support, but that product was not unbundled.
13These  PPAs  may  have  had even more  of a "take or pay"  character  in that the capacity  payments  in the new
PPAs  were clear  and explicit.  Offtakers  had pay for availability  regardless  of dispatch  although  the PPAs did
have the benefit  from the point of view  of the offtaker  of creating  incentives  to maximize  availability  and
5became quite sophisticated, incorporating many of the rules and requirements found in the
England and Wales Grid Code.  These requirements were not inspired by moves towards
reform  and  the introduction  of market structures but  more  to incentivize the  IPP  to
support the purchaser in its system operations role.l4
Many PPAs failed to create clear incentives that resulted in sustained efficiency gains. The
consequential effect was increased cost to the whole system in terms of efficiency  gain and
not simply the loss of specific plant efficiency. In other words, the entire system would
bear  the  cost  of  the inflexibilities or  rigidities created  by  IPP  contracts  which would
ultimately  be paid for by the consumer or the taxpayer.
Problems  Created By IPP  Contracts in a Market  Context
IPP contracts in general, and power purchase agreements (PPAs) in particular, are not easy
to  reconcile with  the  introduction  of  competitive  wholesale markets  and  with  the
achievement of sustained gains in efficiency.
(a)  The contract terms of PPAs and the associated finance and security arrangements
appear, in some cases (usually  with the benefit of hindsight), to be expensivel 5, and
cheaper power on more flexible  terms may become available through the market at
a later date.  In other words they may create stranded costs reflecting their above-
market pricing.
(b)  Because the IPPs are protected  from market risk16  by their long-term PPAs they
have little incentive to  participate in a market.  In some countries, their lack of
participation would seriously  affect the liquidity and indeed the success of the new
market in capturing the benefits of market forces, particularly where the size of the
IPP plant is a significant  proportion of the total plant connected to the system. It is
a basic economic principle that there must be an adequate number  of buyers and
sellers trading sufficient  volumes for a market to work effectively.
(c)  Forced contract renegotiation is extremely difficult, because of the legal sanctity
and enforceability of the contract terms.  The same is true of a non-observance or
breach of the IPP contracts by the power purchaser (whether actual or threatened)
designed to result in renegotiation.  There is an understandable nervousness on the
part of governments and host utilities on the one hand (fearing that it would deter
further  private investment), and  IPPs and their investors and  lenders (as to the
project  economics  and  the  other  project  contract  terms  which  protect  their
interests) on the other.  The process is arduous and lengthy with no  certainty  as to
the outcome.
making  the IPP  indifferent  as to  whether  it was dispatched  or  not which  was beneficial  from  the point  of view
of system  operations.  Earlier  PPAs  did not  always  require  the  offtaker  to buy  all energy  on offer  on  a real
time  basis.  (e.g. the  QFs  in California).
1
4 This  approach,  whilst it may not,  of itself,  assist in  integrating  IPP  contracts  into  new  markets,  will reduce,
to  some  extent,  the difficulties  of  operating  the  IPP  plant  alongside  new  market  structures  and  could  reduce
some  of the stranded  operating  costs.
15  There  may have  been  a lack of  competition  at the bidding  stage  or an even-handed  negotiation  process  may
have  been  absent.
1
6 Market  risk essentially  means  the  risk associated  with  participating  or trading  in  a market,  notably  finding
willing buyers  for  all (or a significant  proportion)  of  the output  of the  plant  at prices  that  are not  so volatile
that  the market  participant  is unable  to  earn  a reasonable,  predictable  return.
6(d)  In  the  early stages  of  any  new  wholesale  market,  prices  and  the  extent  of  market
risk will be  difficult to predict,  quantify  and  mitigate.  There  will always be an  initial
period  for  the  market  to  settle  down  and  market  rules  will  change  to  reflect
operational  experience.  During  this  period,  IPPs  would  prefer  the  certainty  of the
power  purchase  agreements.
In  short, the main problem  areas with IPP  contracts  are:-
*  their  relatively long  duration;
*  the  fixed prices which  are designed to create  a stable and  certain  revenue  stream  for the
IPP;
*  lack of requirement  for the IPP  to assume any market  risk;
*  contract  provisions  that  are  less  demanding  than  detailed  market  rules  which  are
designed  to promote  increased  efficiency and competition
For  these  reasons,  it  has  proven  difficult  to  find  simple  mechanisms  to  integrate  IPP
contracts  and  plant into new wholesale  electricity markets.
A  summary  of  country  experience  with  integrating  IPP  contracts  is  set  forth  briefly  in
Annex  1.  Only  a few countries  have  made  a serious  attempt  to grapple  with  the  problem
of  integrating  IPP  plant  into  new  market.  These  include  Victoria,  Thailand,  Mexico,
Guatemala,  Ontario,  Northern  Ireland,  Portugal  and  Poland.  Of  these,  only the reforms  in
Victoria,  Ontario,  Northern  Ireland,  and  Portugal  have so far been  implemented.  The  rest
are still under  discussion  or are in the run-up  to market  opening.  The countries  which  have
had  notable  IPP  programs  such  as the Philippines,  Hungary17, Indonesia,  Pakistan,  Turkey,
the  Dominican  Republic  have  not  yet  undertaken  or  are  only  now  commencing  a  full
reform  involving  restructuring  and  market  implementation.  In  some  other  cases,  the
capacity  represented  by the IPP  plant  may have  been  too small to be  of significant  concern
from  the point  of view of market  liquidity or stranded  costs.
Potenttia  Impact  of the Power Market  Development  on the IPP
The  design of power  markets  is driven  by the desire  to capture  the benefits  of  competition
for  the  consumer  by increasing  operating  and  plant  efficiency and  distributing  those  gains
to  users  of  the  system.  For  markets  to work  in  an  efficient  manner,  they  must  be  stable
and  achieve  certainty  of  outcome  without  creating  opportunities  for  market  power  abuse
and  gaming.  The market rules  have almost invariably failed to consider  the  special position
of IPPs,  except  by way of  exemption  from  the general  rule in the  case of small plant.  This
is because  the  market  rules  are usually written  to reflect a theoretical  design  (created  in the
absence  of  operational  experience  with  existing  plant)  with  the  objective  of  creating  a
marketplace  in which  efficient  plant  competes  effectively to create a downward  pressure  on
prices.
17 The Hungarian  government  has announced  its intention  to de-regulate  the electricity  industry  and to
restructure  the state-owned  utility,  MVM. IPPs have  protested  and maintained  that a government-backed
decision  by MVM  in 1999  not to sign  more long  term  power  purchase  agreements  has crippled  investment
plans. IPP developers  maintained  that they  have  sunk considerable  amounts  in planning  new  power  stations
which  they stand  to loose if the PPAs  that have  been signed  are not honored. They  maintained  that it will  not
be possible  for the government  to capture  the benefits  of introducing  competition  for the consumer  because
of the existing  low price  of electricity.
7Under the time deadlines and political pressures which accompany sectoral reform decision
making processes, it may have been  thought too difficult or undesirable to factor in the
operational or  economic difficulties of  existing plant.  Choosing the  lowest  common
denominator by  reference to  the  capabilities of  existing plant  or risk allocation under
existing contracts would not achieve the desired efficiency  gain. The market rule designers
may also have been deterred from grappling with the issues because of the perceived legal
sanctity of the IPP contracts.
It  has been a  feature of market design exercises that instead of attempting to integrate
IPPs, the outcome has increased the difficulty of integration and magnified the stranded
costs, diminishing the potential gain to be derived from the existing IPPs on the system.
As a result, the realization of this potential gain to the consumer, derived from competition
when all market participants take full market risk, is likely to be delayed over a relatively
lengthy transition period ormay never be fully  realized.
The impact that the design of the wholesale market will have on  the IPP contracts and
their potential for integration into the market will depend upon the objectives of the new
market and the terms and conditions of the power purchase agreements.  The key criteria
in market design decisions are transparency, fairness, and predictability. The adoption of
an explicit set of technical rules, for  example a Grid  Code, often  designed to improve
system security and reliability  may further widen the gap between the scope of obligations
of the PPA and the requirements of the new market.
Because they  are designed for  a  different purpose,  the  market arrangements in  most
countries  will likely require  IPPs  to  follow rules  (typically much  more  detailed  and
demanding 18) which are not contained in their PPAs. This can create significant additional
costs  for  the IPPs which  they may have no  means of funding. Annex  2 illustrates the
divergence in PPA and market rule obligations. Examples of market obligations include
provision of ancillary  services and congestion management services to maintain reliability,
compliance with  market  rules with  respect  to  scheduling, dispatch, 24  hour  staffing,
communications facilities,  settlement, billings,  metering etc.
It is also true that market rules usually provide real cashflow to market participants to the
extent that they comply with them.  In contrast, obligations imposed by a Grid Code or
technical rules are often not remunerated or require flexibilities  or performance to which
the  IPPs  are  unaccustomed  (e.g. security constrained  dispatch).  The  bifurcation  of
responsibilities between system operators  and market administrators/operators  may also
add to the differences between the old and new worlds.
The risk allocation and contractual protections associated with IPP  projects are likely to
render IPPs and their project agreement counter parties unable or unwilling to relinquish
the protection of their project agreements and to take market risk in a market that has not
yet settled down.  IPPs will be influenced by their project lenders, investors, fuel suppliers
and possibly steam off-takers with which they have entered into long term contracts. Their
ability to perform under  those contracts will be  crucial to  all these parties.  Once the
project debt has been paid and  the investors have received a reasonable return on their
investment,  the  IPP  may  be  more  amenable to  participate in  the  wholesale  market,
18 See "Adaptation  of Market  Rules"  below  for further  details
8particularly  if its plant is effcient  and it is able to compete and minimize the likelihood of
above-market costs. t9
The  price  of  capacity and  energy under  long  term  IPP  contacts  may  prove  to  be
significantly  higher than the prices in the wholesale market.  If the market is well designed
and effectively  captures the benefits of market forces, plant should become more efficient
and more flexible  with the result that prices will tend to decline (in real terms).  However,
IPP  contacts  rarely  contain incentives to  improve  efficiency over  time.  The  power
purchaser will only be able to re-sell the power at the prevailing  market price. The question
then arises as to who should bear the above market costs-- the power purchaser, taxpayers
or consumers.  Typically  consumers foot the bill on the argument that it is for their benefit
that the new market has been introduced.
Potential Impact  on the Power Purchaser
In the course of sector restructuring, the entity to which the IPP contracted to sell power
will  be  reorganized  according  to  the  basic  functions  of  generation,  transmission,
system/market  operations,  distribution and  retail  sales.  It  (or  each  of  its  successor
companies) will usually be a  full market participant carrying out one  or more  of these
functions. It  might become  a  company designed to  hold  residual liabilities or  handle
stranded cost-recovery,  as was the case in Ontario.  It may still be required to comply with
the market rules.  IPP contracts can expose contract holders (i.e. power purchasers) to a
number of new risks following  the introduction of a competitive market. The difference in
the price payable to the IPP under  the PPA and the prices at which power is sold and
bought  in  the  new wholesale market exposes the power  purchaser/contract  holder to
significant financial risk in  the form  of  stranded costs. In  addition,  inadequate or  no
scheduling and  dispatch rights under  the  contract  (which were  a  feature of  the  first
generation of PPAs) may:
(i)  prevent contract holders from taking advantage of profitable opportunities to use the
plant to provide ancillary  services;
(ii)  expose the contract holder/power purchaser to claims for damages  by the IPP in the
event that the IPP is  not paid if the plant is not dispatched pursuant to the market
rules and it earns less than it would have done if it had been dispatched2D;
(iii)  make it difficult for the contract holder/power purchaser to comply strictly  with the
new market rules which will be binding on it if, for example, it has no contractual
right to obtain certain information that the rules require to be provided to the system
operator  (ISO) (e.g. notice  of impending trip  or change in  operational capability
which might result in the contract holder having to make payments under the market
rules for resulting imbalances) or cannot instruct the IPP to follow market rules e.g.
with  respect  to  dispatch,  the  provision  of  ancillary services  or  transmission
congestion management measures.
19  There is evidence of this emerging in Poland despite the fact that it is by no means certain that IPPs will be
allowed to recover the full amount of their above-market costs
20 The power purchaser may  have been able to schedule and dispatch and to order plant off the system in an
emergency but, under the older PPAs, it would have had to pay an energy charge for power not taken.  Under
the later PPAs it would have paid a capacity charge to the IPP.
9Incidence  ofAbove-Market  Costs
As  noted  above,  a major  risk is that  the  price  of  capacity  and  energy under  long  term  IPP
contracts  may prove  to be  significantly  higher  than  the  prices  in the wholesale  market.  If
the  quantity  of  power  purchased  from  an  IPP  is  small  and  the  power  purchaser  is  a
distributor  or retailer to captive end-consumers,  the regulator  could allow the  distributor  to
pass  the  purchase  costs  on  to  the  end-consumers,  in which  case the  above-market  costs
will be  hidden  or blended  with the  cost  of other  purchases  in the wholesale  market.  If the
contract  holder/power  purchaser  is not  able to pass  the costs  on  to consumers  in this way
(e.g. because  the regulator  does  not  allow it or  because  the  consumers  are  customers  with
the  option  of  purchasing  from  other retailers),  the  above-market  or  stranded2l costs will be
apparent.  In this case, it will be able to resell the power  only at the  prevailing market  price.
The  question  then  arises as to who  should  bear  the  above-market  costs.  Should  they rest
with  the  power  purchaser/contract  holder,  which  (depending  upon  what  its functions  have
become  as  a result  of  the restructuring)  may  be  in a poor  position  to manage  or  mitigate
them?  Should  the  power  purchaser/contract  holder  be  compensated  in  some  form  for
having  inherited  PPAs  which  at  one  time  appeared  to  be  economic  but  are no  longer  so
because  of the introduction  of the new market?.
The  choice as to who  should bear the  above market  costs lies between:-
*  the  power  purchaser/contract  holder,  or  rather,  its  shareholders  which  may  be  in  the
public  or private  sector;
*  the  tax  payers  at  large,  on  the  basis that  power  sector  reform  is in the  public  interest;
and
*  the  consumers  of electricity, on the basis that  they are the ultimate  direct beneficiaries  of
the reforms  and  because their  electricity bills  provide  a relatively simple mechanism  for
raising a levy to realize revenues  to fund  the  above-market  costs.
Most  governments  that  have  addressed  the  issue have  decided  that,  as a matter  of  policy,
the  shareholders  should  not  bear  the  burden,  particularly  if  private  sector  investors  are
involved,  and  that  the  consumers,  who  should  most  directly  benefit  from  the  reforms,
should  contribute  to the funding  of what  is essentially a cost of transition  to the benefits  of
competition  which  they will ultimately  enjoy. 22 This policy is usually driven by a concern
on the  part of government  that using public  or taxpayer  funds  will provoke  criticism  as well
as. jurisdictional  and  political  issues.  There  is  also  the  fear  that  using  shareholder  or
successor  company  funds  will deter  investment  and undermine  the  financial viability of the
successor  company.  Quantifying  and  recovering  above-market  costs  is discussed  in  more
detail below.
The Meaning  of "Saoceiac of the IPP Contacts
In  the  context  of  the  impending  introduction  of  competitive  electricity markets,  IPPs  may
take the position  that every word in their  contracts  is sacrosanct.  Faced with the  threat  that
21 These  costs  are stranded  because  there  is no means  in the  marketplace  to recover  them. They  are called
above-market  costs  to distinguish  them  from other  types  of stranded  cost.
22 Indeed,  in California  and Ontario  the above-market  or stranded  cost levy  on consumers  was  termed  a
"competition  transition  charge".
10the  economic  bargain  reflected  in  their  contracts  may  not  be  honored  to  the  letter,  this
stance is understandable.  However,  a strict interpretation  of  any contract  is not  supported
in many  jurisdictions  if damages  which  result  from  a more  relaxed  interpretation  are non-
existent  or de minimis,  if they cannot  be quantified,  or are too remote.
Remoteness  of damage  or loss is a legal concept  that will not allow claims for damages  that
were  not  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  when  the  contract  was entered  into.  In
some  cases the  courts  may  only allow  the recovery  of  sunk  costs  but  PPAs  are  essentially
agreements  guaranteeing  a revenue  stream  over the  duration  of the  contract.  In  this  case,
the  magnitude  of  future  earnings  is  usually in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  which
would  give rise  to  damages  for loss  of  future  earnings.  Indeed,  some  of  the  later PPAs
provide  a formula  for calculating  the  net  present  value of  these revenues  which  would  be
payable in the event  of breach,  termination  or buyout.
In  contrast,  orders  for  specific  or  exact  performance  of  contract  terms  are  difficult  to
obtain.  Typically,  they  will only be  available if  damages  are  not  an  appropriate  remedy,
which  they  usually  are.  Civil  law  tends  to  respect  the  economic  balance  between  the
contracting  parties  as opposed  to the  strict  letter of the  contract.  In  short,  courts  tend  not
to take an  approach  that  ensures  perfect  performance  of every detail of  the  contract  terms
if damages  are an appropriate  remedy.  This  appears to be a doctrine  of the  contract  law of
many developed  countries.
Moreover,  guarantees  of  the  power  purchaser's  obligations  will  not  require  actual
performance  of  the  detailed  contract  terms  either.  They  will  usually  only  guarantee
payments  under  the  PPA.  This  means  that  the  IPPs  cannot  rely upon  the  guarantee  to
ensure  that the  contracts  are complied  with strictly, for example, in relation  to details which
are important  from  an operational  standpoint.  They may be  able to rely on  them  to cover
payment  defaults but probably  only after considerable  delay and possibly  litigation.
The  Government  of  Ontario  initially  issued  a  statement  that  the  sanctity  of  existing
contracts  would  be  preserved,  but  subsequently  clarified  that  it  did  not  mean  that  each
contract  term, however  minor,  should  remain  intact.  The  thrust  of  the  approach  was that
the  IPP  contracts  should continue  to maintain  the  commercial  bargain  between  the parties,
but  subject to that, the IPPs  should expect  to comply with  the market  rules.
Approaches to Integrating  IPPs into Power Markets
Integrating  IPPs  into  new  markets  created  as  a result  of  power  sector  restructuring  holds
the  promise  of  benefiting  consumers  through  increased  competition,  liquidity  and  hence
efficiency.  The  objective  is  to  do  so in  a  manner  which  minimizes  above-market  costs
while  protecting  the IPP  economics  during  the transition.
Integrating  IPPs  into  wholesale  market  arrangements  will require  modification  of  at  least
some  of  the  following:  market  rules,  IPP  contract  terms,  identity  and  powers  of  the
contract  holder,  contract  management  arrangements,  and  mechanisms  for  funding  above-
market  costs  associated  with  the  IPP  contracts.  The  challenge  is to  do  so  in a  manner
which  incentivizes  IPP  integration  without  unduly  compromising  market  efficiency  nor
system reliability.
11There are several potential approaches to addressing the difficulties discussed in the prior
section. These approaches incorporate different combinations of policy measures and can
be characterized as follows:
*  forced market integration
*  forced contract negotiation
*  integration by adaptation of market rules
*  virtual generation/managed contracts
*  voluntary renegotiation
*  contract buyout.
Figure 1 shows policy measures associated with various integration options. The following
section discusses the salient features of each option. Their applicability  to specific country
circumstances will depend on the proportion of IPP plant to total generating capacity,  the
degree of surplus generation capacity, the goals and design of the sector reform program
itself, and overall economic conditions existent in a given country.
12Figure  1
Policy Measures for Dealing with IPPs
Approach  Policy  Measures
Name  Change  Change  Change  Contract  Change Funding
Market  Contract  Holder/Manager  Arrangements
Rules  Terms
1.  Forced  market
integration  (by
legislation)
2.  Integration  by
adaptation of  market
rules  'I
3.  Forced  renegotiation
4.  Virtual  generation/
managed  contract
5.  Financially facilitated
market  integration
6.  Contract buyout
7.  Fully  facilitated  market  ,,a
integration
8.  Facilitated  voluntary  % 
renegotiation  or
buyout
The  four policy measures  described  in Figure  1 give rise to  six main approaches  which  are
described  more  fully below.  These  approaches  are meant  to achieve several goals:-
*  increase market  liquidity, efficiency and  competitiveness;
*  reduce  above-market  costs;
*  enhance  system reliability;
*  increase plant  efficiency;
*  improve  grid and market  discipline.
Foiced Market IAtegition
IPPs  could  be required  by legislation  to  become  market  participants  where  the  legislation
simply  applied  to  all  generators  equally  without  considering  existing  contract  terms
between  the  IPP  and  off  taker.  In  Guatemala,  this  approach  did not,  in  fact  achieve  any
13significant result.  The IPPs essentially  ignored the legislative  requirements and rested on
their contract rights.
This approach leaves the IPP with two difficult choices, it can:
(a)  seek damages for constructive termination23  of the PPA.  The scope for this may be
limited by the terms of the PPA and/or by the general law which may limit damages
to  losses actually arising and  may  in  any event  not  permit  the  IPP  to  recover
foregone profits; or
(b)  agree to become a full market participant selling its power through the new market
on  behalf  of  the  power  purchaser/contract  holder,  and  attempt  to  negotiate a
position under which the power purchaser/contract holder makes good any shortfall
between the contract price and the actual market price received by the IPP under the
market rules.
This is a high risk approach for a government to pursue.  If it is perceived as forcing a
constructive breach or termination of the PPA by use of its legislative  powers, it could be
accused of a form of expropriation without compensation and would find itself in litigation
or arbitration on both constitutional and contract grounds.  It would significantly  damage
its reputation with its own private sector and with international financiers.
Forced Contract Renegotiation
Another  interventionist approach is when government  forces renegotiation  of the IPP
contracts so that they not only become compatible with the technical and trading rules of
the new market but also require the IPPs to be active market participants taking full (or at
least partial) market risk.  This clearly suffers from some of the same difficulties of the
forced integration approach outlined in the previous section.
Forced  renegotiation of  PPAs would  likely meet  with  hostility from  the  international
investment community.  If the experience in Pakistan24  and Northern Ireland is anything  to
go by, not only does it involve imnmense  effort and expense, it may produce relatively  small
results for the contract holder/power purchaser. Only if the outcome of the renegotiation
could be predicted  to  achieve a result that is both  fair and satisfactory to both  parties
would it be worth  undertaking.  However, the risk of the government undermining its
credibility and  its ability to  attract investment in  the  future would  be  significant. The
difference  is  that  negotiation  by  definition  is  not  a  unilateral  action  over  which
governments  can  simply exert  their legislative authority.  Unilateral  action  to  change
contract terms could amount to expropriation of rights as well as breach of contract.
Governments  may  contemplate  a  threatened  or  actual  breach  by  the  contract
holder/power purchaser of the PPAs in order to bring about the renegotiation. Economic,
as distinct from legal argumentation has at times been advanced that non-observance or
breach of an agreement could be an efficient course of action if it proves to be more
23  Constructive  termination  means  that although  there  was  no formal  termination  by one party  to the PPA,
the actions  of that party  lead  to no other conclusion  than the party  intended  to and,  in fact, did terminate  it.
24The  attempts  to renegotiate  IPP contracts  in Pakistan  were  not prinarily  driven  by the desire  to integrate
them into  a potential  new  market.
14economic than to comply with the contract to the letter.25 While this notion can find a
conceptual basis in neoclassical  welfare economics and game theory, it is obviously unlikely
to engender a great deal of sympathy or co-operation on the part of the IPP and will lead
to the same problem as any other form of  forced renegotiation.
Ultimately, the legal system sets the framework or failback for renegotiation, particularly  if
breach or non-compliance with the PPA is threatened or actually takes place.  Pursuing
claims through litigation or arbitration invariably creates considerable uncertainty, delay
and expense for all parties. If both parties feel that they have strong cases, they will be
placed in  a  position of considerable reliance on  the agreed dispute resolution process
which,  however  developed and  sophisticated, is  likely to  create uncertainty  as to  its
outcome.  It  may act  as a  disincentive rather  than  an  incentive to  reach  agreement.
Moreover, dispute resolution processes never create the kind of negotiating chips that the
parties think ought to be available. The issues involved in integrating IPP  contracts into
markets have not been addressed through one of these processes and it is not clear whether
a court or an arbitrator would take a narrow view of the issues in dispute or a broader view
considering the public policy issues involved in  the whole reform process.  Therefore,
reliance on dispute resolution processes rather than regulatory processes may prove to be
clumsy, slow, costly, and of uncertain outcome.
An  alternative  approach  to  facilitating  the  initiation  of  renegotiations  is  for  the
Government  to invoke the  "change of law" clause under  PPA.  These clauses which
appear in most PPAs, entitle the IPP payments to cover increased costs brought about by a
change of law.  Since markets are often introduced through  new legislation,  the contract
holder/power  purchaser could use the clause to call all IPPs to the negotiating table on the
same basis, in order to discuss consequences  of the change of law.
In order to  maintain investor confidence and  credibility, this process would have to be
extremely fair and transparent and treat all IPPs in the same manner.  This could produce
difficulties  if the PPAs and plant are very different.  One unit might simply not physically
be able to comply with a particular contract term or market rule (because of its design)
whereas another unit would readily  be able to do so.
One instrument which may be considered in inducing IPPs to particpate in the new market
is to require conversion of a power purchase agreement into its financial equivalent, a so-
called "contract for differences" (CfD),26  which would hedge the uncertainties surrounding
prices in the  new market . Contracts for differences are financial hedging instruments
which are also derivatives.
They are usually cast as put and call option contracts to pay the difference between the
market price and the agreed strike price. Although no physical commodity sale is involved,
they can be quite complex and detailed with the terms "sculpted" to reflect the physical
properties of the generating plant in question.  Risks, including the basic operations and
maintenance risks are often more precisely  defined and allocated than would be the case in
a traditional PPA.  Force majeure relief may be limited or not be allowed at all.
25 Optimal  breach  of contract  might  be construed  as preferable  to rigid  encorcement  of original  conditions  of
a contract  if the  cost  of performing  exceeds  the cost  to  the other  party of  not  performing.  This  begs  the
question  as to whether  legal remedies  for  breach  are designed  to  promote  informal  renegotiation.
26  A contract  for  differences  is a financial  hedge  which  provides  purchasers  and sellers  the option  to  replace
the  spot  market  with  a fixed  price.
15In  order  for  counter-parties  to  take positions  in  a CfD,  two  elements  are required.  First,
there  needs to be  a publicly available and  economically  meaningful  reference  price for spot
power.  This requires  a transparent  and  stable wholesale  market.  Second,  in order  for the
CfDs  to be  liquid  (i.e., transferable  to third  parties  and  of  uniform  terms  and  conditions),
the  country  needs  to have  laws permitting  these transactions27.  Therefore,  this  option  can
only really be put in place in the latter stages  of the sector  restructuring  as it follows market
structure  and design of market  rules.
Another  alternative  is to put  in place  a simple mechanism  designed  to track  the  difference
between  the  amount  of  money  that  the  IPP  would  have  received  in  the  market  and  the
amount  that  it would  have  been  paid  under  its  PPA.  The  PPA  could  be  rewritten  to
require  the  IPP  to participate  in the market in accordance  with the  market  rules and  for the
contract  holder  to pay  the  difference.  This  should  produce  a satisfactory  outcome  for the
IPP,  its  lenders  and  investors.  However,  it  begs  the  question  as  to  how  the  difference
would  be  funded  and  when  and  if  the  IPP  would  take  on  similar market  risks  as  other
participants.
While  the  government  or  regulator  which  forced  the  renegotiation  could  make  it clear  at
the  outset  of  the  process  that  a  satisfactory  outcome  for  the  IPP  would  be  assured,  this
would  be unlikely to incentivize  the IPP  to adopt  anything  other than  a passive  approach  at
the  negotiating  table.  It would  certainly  not  be  incentivized  to  find innovative  solutions
designed  to  ease  integration,  maximize  the  effectiveness  of  the  new  competitive
marketplace  or  to  minimize  above-market  costs.  Encouraging  the  IPP  to  put  forward
solutions  will be  very useful,  as it will best  understand  the  capabilities  of  its own  plant  as
well  as  the  opportunities  the  new  market  may present.  It  should  also  be  well  placed  to
provide input  into the design  of the  market  rules to ease integration.  This is the reason  that
the  voluntary  renegotiation  approach  referred  to  below  may  have  better  prospects  for
producing  positive  outcomes.
Voluntary  Renegotiation
It  is not  out  of  the  realm  of  the  possible  to  create  markets  that  present  such  attractive
opportunities  that  IPPs  are  prepared  to renegotiate  their  contracts  voluntarily  so that  they
can  participate  at least  to  some  degree  in  the  market.  Just  as all markets  have  distinctive
characteristics,  so too  do IPPs.  The  ideal solution  needs  to be  thought  through  on  a case-
by-case basis.  Innovative  ideas may  provide  the  best  answers  from  all perspectives.  For
this  reason,  if  it  can  be  achieved,  a  voluntary,  rather  than  a  forced  approach  to
renegotiation  is  preferable.  In  order  to  bring  the  IPPs  to  the  negotiating  table  in
circumstances  that  are  likely  to  achieve  efficient  and  tractable  solutions  from  all
perspectives,  it is useful  to look for incentives  that will assist both parties.
If the PPA  can be  renegotiated  on  a basis that  integrates  the  IPP  into  the  market  to some
extent,  for  example,  by allowing  the  IPP  to  sell any  uncontracted  capacity  28  or  ancillary
services  into  the  market  and  eam  more  revenues  which  it  could  share  with  the  power
purchaser,  the  IPP  will  give  up  nothing  and  will gain.  The  power  purchaser  will also
27 Even  in the US,  the legal  and regulatory  framework  is quite  restrictve.
28 A note of caution, however, disputes have arisen in Portugal and Ontario as to whether the uncontracted
capacity belongs to the IPP or to the power purchaser.  Typically the agreement will provide that all of the
capacity and energy output of the plant must be sold to the power purchaser but at the same time it will only
be required to purchase a specified amount.  The legal position in this circumstance tends to be unclear.
16benefit because it will reduce its above-market costs and its exposure under the market
rules with which it must comply.  The  IPP could even be asked to  share some of its
additional revenues with the contract holder/power  purchaser.  Consumers will benefit
from a more liquid  market and a lower stranded cost levy.
In  their article "Contracts  and  the  Institutional Environment  for  Electricity Reform",
Albert L. Danielson, Nainish K  Gupta and Peter G. Klein 29  quote examples of successful
renegotiations of NUG  contracts 30, arguing that this approach can generate gains for all
parties and should not be discouraged by regulators or the courts in upholding existing
contracts.  They quote the case of Citizens Power which successfully restructured some
NUG  contracts  through  a  combination  of  physical  and  financial engineering  that
maintained economic value for NUG while generating substantial savings for the utility.
The outcome of the restructuring of the contracts included:-
*  transferring certain risks to the utility to minimize  the cost of funds;
*  lowering levels  of power flow at above-market  prices to the utility;
*  extending the contract  duration by  5 years at  a  price  consistent with  market price
projections;
*  dividing the single energy price into an energy and a capacity component3l.
There are other  slightly more aggressive methods of renegotiating PPAs on  a voluntary
basis.  In California, purchasers took a "firm but fair" approach to contract administration.
If a power producer wanted to change any element of a PPA (size,  location, fuel type, etc.),
the purchaser would attempt to restructure the financial terms in return.  The purchaser
typically desired greater  curtailment rights, capacity and  energy price  reductions,  and
shortening the duration of the PPA (this was possible because typically  the capital costs of
the project are usually paid off in less than half the length of the typical 25-30 year PPA
term). Other changes included levelizing  payments to avoid front loading.
A purchaser would still negotiate to pay for dispatchability  or a shorter term once a plant
was operating.  This required a valuation of these attributes from the perspective of the
purchaser, which the regulator often rejected. Since the renegotiations were predicated on
regulatory approval (so that the costs could be passed through to customers), these bilateral
negotiations  had  an  invisible third  party  at  the  table  in  the  form  of  the  regulator.
Regulators are not always  well equipped to take a commercial  view of the value of contract
attributes.  For the most part, they would do better  to rely on the economic incentives of
the contract parties to reach the right deal.
Another variant is to restructure the PPA as a tolling arrangement to mitigate market risk.
A  tolling agreement can be put in place between the IPP and an entity that both supplies
fuel and sells the output of the power plant. This provides a hedge between the cost of the
fuel and the price of the power sold.  The payment regime could be structured to cover
some or all of the debt service.
29 ElectricityJournal  December  1999  pages  51-60,  Elsevier  Science  Inc.
30 "NUG" refers  to non-utility  generation  wvhich  is  independent  of investor-owned  utilities.  It is, therefore,
equivalent  to IPP plant.
31A two  part  price should  be more  cost-reflective  and ensure  that the IPPs fixed  costs  are paid  if the plant is
available.
17Contract Renegotdation FacWitation  Process
Several governments  and regulators  have sought to establish  a  contract renegotiation
facilitation  process. 32 Certainly,  consulting  IPPs about intended  restructurings  or reforms
would be helpful,  if  only to assist in calming  fears of the unknown and establishing
credibility  for the process. The "change  in law" dause commonly  found in PPAs (which
indemnifies  IPPs from any additional  costs)  could  be used to invite  IPPs to the negotiating
table on a neutral  basis.
There remains  the risk that a facilitation  process  could  be perceived  as leading  to  forced
renegotiation. Accordingly,  it would  have to be established  on a basis  that was extremely
fair and transparent. It would be necessary  for government  to give assurances  that the
outcome would not disadvantage the IPP33. If an independent regulator has been set up, it
might be preferable  to allow  the regulatory  body to conduct the process to reduce the
scope for politicization.  In developing  countries,  where the legal  and regulatory  framework
is often not well developed  nor tested,  investors  and lenders  may well be nervous  about
relying  on the contract terms  and the ability  of the courts to enforce  them against  public
sector  contract  holders  and guarantors.
The type of contract  renegotiation  facilitation  process  in Ontario  involved  an independent
team of advisers  establishing  a menu of possible  amendments  and solutions  as a basis  for
discussion  and to provoke further ideas.  This approach was particularly  beneficial  in
relation to the treatment  of consequential  amendments  to the PPAs,  which were brought
about as a result  of the restructuring  of the contract  holder/power  purchaser  into successor
companies  and to deal with certain  other aspects  that needed change  (e.g.  price inflation
indices  which  no longer  existed).
In  Ontario and  Thailand, a  contract manager was appointed who was financially
incentivized  to seek mutually  beneficial  solutions  to facilitate  voluntary  renegotiation.  This
could be facilitated  by the government  or the regulator  setting  up a process  to encourage
rather than coerce the parties  to determine  if a suitable  adaptation  of the PPA could be
agreed upon that would ease integration and/or  minimize above-market  costs. For
example,  a contract  manager  could  be given  a percentage  of the above-market  costs that
were avoided  as a result of the outcome  of the re-negotiation  or could  be given  a fixed  or
variable  bonus (within  a cap and collar)  for finding  and achieving  the implementation  of a
solution  to which  the parties  had agreed.
Adaptaton  ofMtarkt  Rules
As explained  above,  there is likely  to be a significant  gap between  the operating  provisions
of the PPA and the technical  and commercial  rules of the new market. It may  be possible
to facilitate  integration  into the market  by designing  or modifying  the rules  to minimize  the
gap.
Market rules are considerably  more detailed than that  of even the latest and most
sophisticated  PPAs. The market  rules are meant to achieve  three  principal  goals:  (1)  create
a legally  enforceable  set of procedures  for a complex  set of trading  arrangements,  both on a
forward  and real time basis,  that is certain  and auditable  (2)  provide  incentives  to improve
32e.g. Pakistan,  Guatemala,  Ontario,  Northem  Ireland.
33The assurance  should  be given  in a manner  that would  deter the government  or regulator  from  reneging  on
it.
18reliability,  plant  performance,  and  flexibility, as well  as grid  and  market  discipline,  and  (3)
ensure  non-discriminatory  access to transmission  and  distribution  systems.  In  contrast,  the
PPA  is designed primarily  to  ensure  that  the contract  holder/power  purchaser  receives  the
capacity and  energy  for which  it has contracted  and  that  the  IPP  is paid  for it.  In  the later,
PPAs,  the  IPP  may  also be  required  to  support  the  power  purchaser  in its  role  as system
operator.  Market  rules  therefore  imply  additional  obligations  for  the  IPP  which  carry
additional  costs  for which  there  is no  machinery  in the  pricing  formulae  or in the  contract
terms  allowing for reimbursement  under  the PPA.  34
The  size of  the gap  also depends  upon  the  degree of  complexity  and  the  objectives  of  the
market  design,  particularly  if  there  are  detailed,  market-based  rules  relating  to  balancing,
ancillary services,  and  congestion  management.  In  developing  countries  these  rules  may
not be  at all sophisticated  but  are  necessary  in order  to  foster grid  discipline.  How  these
rules  are formulated  places  different  risks on  each of  the market  participants  and  requires
them  to  learn  new  commercial  skills  with  respect  to  trading  in  parallel  competitive
markets35.  IPPs  may  well  not  have  the  managerial  nor  financial  capacity  to  do  so,
particularly  if they  are project  financed. Moreover,  prudential  requirements  are imposed  on
market  participants  under  market  rules  to protect  against  payment  default.  IPPs,  like all
other  market  participants  would  need  to have access to  funding  to make deposits,  financial
guarantees  or  a  substantial  credit  rating  which  typically  they  may  not  have  if  they  are
project  financed.
Sector  restructuring  models  which  require  a  mandatory  pool  or  power  exchange  may
preclude  bilateral  contracts  that  could  otherwise  allow  an  IPP  to  adopt  the  so  called
"anchor  tenant  approach".  This  would  enable  part  of  the  IPP  plant  output  to  be  sold
directly  to  an  industrial  consumer,  for  example,  under  a  long  term  contract  with  the
balance being  traded  in the  competitive  wholesale  market.  In  this way the IPP  could hedge
much  of  the  market  risk.  This  is particularly  suitable  for  co-generation  facilities  where
revenues  from  sales of steam  are used  to underpin  the financing.  However,  revenues  from
these  sources  are  usually  not  sufficient  to  cover  all of  the  debt  service  but  if  the  power
plant  has  a  relatively  low  cost  position,  there  can  be  a  high  degree  of  confidence  that
revenues  from  trading  in  the  market  will  be  satisfactory.  On  the  other  hand,  some
governments  and  regulators  are  reluctant  to allow  this approach  because  it will allow new
IPPs  to cherry pick  the best industrial  customers  and keep  those  customers  out  of the  new
market, which  may affect liquidity on the demand  side.
If addressed  early in the  sector restructuring  process,  the market  rules  could  be  designed to
attract  new entrants  where  new generating  capacity is urgently  needed,  and  also to motivate
existing  IPPs  to  voluntarily  participate  in  the  new  market.  At  its  most  basic  level,  the
market  rules  could  be  adapted  to minimize  the  administrative  costs  of participating  in  the
market  (eg. requiring  new  communications  facilities or  24 hour/7  days per week  manning
requirements  which  add cost).
34PPAs  do usually  allow  for claims  to be made  for reimbursement  of increased  costs  caused  by a change  in
law  or change  in tax. Arguably,  if the government  were to use new  legislation  to force  market  integration,
IPPs could  make  a claim  under  these  contractual  protections  for any increased  costs  that they incurred.
35  Parallel  or separate  competitive  markets  exist  in a number  of jurisdictions,  particularly  where  ancillary
services  are purchased  and paid for separately.  There may  be separate  or parallel  markets  in energy  (e.g.  a
bilateral  contract  market,  a day-ahead  market,  an on-the-day  market,  a real time  or balancing  market),  in
ancillary  services  and in congestion  management  measures.  Market  participants  will  have  considerable
freedom  of choice  as to which  markets  they  trade in, the prices  and services  they offer and the period  of their
commitments.
19Often  market  rules  contain exemptions for  small plant,  which  could  be  extended to
existing IPPs on a transitional basis. These include requirements to subrmit  schedules and
certain operating information and in  the case of the smallest plant,  to  follow dispatch
instructions  and  provide  ancillary services. However,  the  dilemma is  whether  these
exemptions will compromise the efficiency of the market (particularly the new basis for
economic dispatch).  Another  option is to include a transitional capacity payment in the
market rules to encourage IPPs to participate and take market risk. Thus far no jurisdiction
has made a significant attempt to follow this approach.
A summary of the gap between typical  PPA provisions and market rules is set out in Annex
2.  Minimizing the  gap  will certainly make  life  easier for  the  ISO  and  the  power
purchaser/contract holder and may reduce above-market costs.
Vitual GenewdoAiManged PPA
In the course of sector restructuring, the PPAs are transferred or assigned to a successor
entity to the original  power purchaser/contract holder.  The successor may be government-
owned or private.  There is obviously a  choice of successor company resulting from a
typical restructuring and this choice usually  lies between another generator or a distributor
and/or  retailer. Such an entity will typically  be a full market participant able to sell or resell
the power produced  by the IPP into the market, preferably with a mandate to minimize
above-market costs.
A distinction can be drawn between two roles of the power purchaser/contract holder, that
of a contract party under the PPA and that of contract manager, carrying out the day-to-
day administration of the contract terms and  the performance  of the contract holder's
obligations.  It is possible to appoint a separate contract manager as a surrogate or agent
for the power purchaser/contract holder to carry out certain functions under that contract
with a view to achieving specific objectives, notably to maximize the proceeds of sale so
that the above-market costs are reduced.
The distinction between the role of contract holder and contract manager is derived from
an analysis of the functions of the power purchaser under the PPA.  The contract holder
carries out the  functions of the party to the contract e.g. dealing with funding, contract
amendments or buy-out.  The contract manager, on the other hand, is responsible for the
day-to-day administration of the PPA and the operational relationships with the IPP and
the ISO.  It can more easily participate in the market to resell the IPPs contracted capacity
and energy.
The benefits to this approach include:
(a)  existing contractual rights of the IPPs are preserved;
(b)  need  for change to the PPAs is minimized - it requires least - disturbance, if a
decision is made at an early stage to adopt this approach ; and
(c)  the contract manager focuses on bidding the output  of the contracted capacity
into the competitive market as if the plant belonged to the contract manager itself
- hence the name "virtual generation".
In Victoria, Australia, the contract manager is called the PPA Trader. The existing PPAs
were assigned to one of four PPA Traders, each licensed to adrninister one of the PPAs as
20a "virtual generator" as if it owned the contracted capacity  and energy. They purchased the
energy pursuant to the PPAs and sold it into the electricity  pool.  The loss they sustained
was fed back into the market as a levy against all market participants. This levy was then
passed through to customers.  In this case the contract managers were not incentivized to
minimize above-market costs.
A variant of this is applicable in the context of a restructuring and privatization.  A PPA
may be assigned to a successor company with a portfolio of generating plant.  It could bid
the  output  of  the  IPP  plant  into  the  market  along  with  the  output  of  its  other  plant.36
Owning or managing a portfolio of generating plant in a competitive market has certain
advantages over the ownership of or rights to a single  plant as the pooling of assets permits
greater flexibilities in their optimization.  The above-market costs of the IPP would be
reflected in a reduction in the acquisition price of the assets to reflect the above-market
costs of the PPA, which form part of the portfolio. In this instance, the Treasury/tax payer
bears  the  cost.  If  cost  pass-through  is permitted,  then  the  assets  are valued upward
accordingly  with a corresponding increase in acquisition price.  In this instance, consumers
bear the cost in proportion to the degree of cost pass-through
Contract Buyout
The  government  may  arrange  the  buyout  of  IPP  contracts  either  by  the  contract
holder/power  purchaser or by third parties. Termination or buyout of the contract in this
way would require the consent of the IPP's  lenders, bond  holders, and possibly equity
investors.  They would be unlikely to consent unless a buyout price is paid that will cover
outstanding debt and the present value of the revenue-earning potential of the investors
and bond holders. While some of the more recent PPAs do contemplate contract buyout,
many of the earlier PPAs have no machinery for this and a buyout price would have to be
negotiated.
If the contract holder/power purchaser were to buy the contract out, the likely  result could
be the purchase of the IPP plant itself with which the new contract holder would then
participate in  the new market, taking full market risk.  If the power purchaser/contract
holder is not able to  raise funding to buy out the contract, an alternative would be  to
arrange for buyouts by third parties through an auction process. Bidders could be required
to purchase the contracts (or even the IPP  plant) on  the basis that they would take full
market risk.  The question then  arises as to whether third party, private sector contract
buyers would substantially discount the buyout price that  they were prepared to  bid to
reflect uncertainties associated with the new market.
The Ministry of Finance in Ontario took preliminary steps to initiate an auction process for
third party contract buyouts, which it later abandoned.  It was felt that contract buyers
might  be  difficult to  find  and  would  substantially discount  the prices  that  they were
prepared to bid due to uncertainties of the new market.  The Ontario  government was
initially attracted  to  the  prospect  of  crystallizing above-market costs  at  an  early stage
through a competitive tender process rather than running the risk that these costs would
continue to be incurred for the 25-40 year terms of the PPAs. It later realized that it would
have to fund any difference between the buyout price that third parties were prepared to
offer and the price that would fully compensate the IPPs.  The auction process may take
place at a later date once the market has settled down.  In the meantime, the plan is to
appoint  suitably experienced contract  managers incentivized both  to  minimize above-
36This  approach  was  at one point  proposed  for the Philippines.
21market  costs  and  to  attract  the  IPPs  to voluntarily  renegotiate  their  contracts  to  achieve
partial market  integration.
Comparing the Approaches
Figure 2 compares  alternative  approaches  to integrating  IPPs  into wholesale  power  markets
according  to five evaluation  criteria that have formed  the basis of the  foregoing  discussion
22Figure  2  Approaches  to Integrating  IPPs into Power Markets
Evaluation  Criteria  Forced  Forced  Market Rules  Virtual  Voluntary  Contract Buyout
Market  Renegotiation  Modification  generation/  Renegotiation
Integration  Managed PPA
1.  May  adversely  affect  Yes  Yes  No  No  No,  if  process  Yes,  unless  IPP
credibility  of  transparent  compensation  is
Goverrment  and fair  fair
2.  May  deter  future  Yes  Yes  No  No  No,  if  process  No,  if  IPP
investors  transparent  compensation  is
and fair.  fair
3.  May  adversely  affect  Yes  Yes  Yes  unless  No  No  (IPP  Yes unless IPP is
IPPs economic position  exemptions  unlikely  to  fully
reflected in PPA.  are granted.  agree  to  any  compensated.
deterioration)
4.  May reduce impact  on  Yes  Yes  (depends  Unlikely  Yes, if  an  effort  Yes  (depends  No,  unless
consumners of  above-  on outcome)  is  made  to  on outcome)  buyout  price
market costs.  reduce  above-  offered  by  third




5.  May  adversely  affect  No  No  (depends  Yes  (but  it  No  Maybe  No
efficiency  or  on outcome)  may  be  (depends  on
competitiveness of new  transitional)  outcome)
electricity  market place.
In  sunmmary:
- The  forced  market  integration  and  forced  renegotiation  approaches  have  been  attempted  but  are  very
unlikely  to  achieve  a satisfactory  outcome  from  the  point  of  view  of  IPPs  or  consumers.
*  The  adaptation  of the  market  rules, on a transitional  or exempting  basis could, in some  circumstances  prove
successful  provided  that  the  market  could  still work  efficiently  and  competitively  with  respect  to  other
generating  plant.
*  The  virtual/managed  PPA  approach  could  be  a  useful  technique  provided  that  the  contract  manager  is
incentivized  to minimize  above-market  costs.
*  Voluntary  renegotiation  stands  a  much  better  chance  of  succeeding  than  forced  renegotiation  if  there  is
innovative  thinking  to find mutualy  beneficial  solutions.
*  Contract  buyout  has  the  advantage  of  crystalizing  above-market  costs  at  an  early stage,  but  inexperience
with the new market  and  the likelihood  of having  to make mid course  adjustments  to market  rules may result
in contract  bidders  demanding  a "new  market risk premium"  which  will magnify  above-market  costs.
These  approaches  are  not  mutualy  exclusive  but  rather  may  be  used  in  combination.  One  combination  that
appears  to  have  good  prospects  for  delivering  successful  outcomes  is the  adaptation  of  market  rules  coupled
with a change  of contract  manager  and voluntary  renegotiation.Designing  New  IPP Contracts
It  is not  the  case that  IPP  contracts  and  new power  markets  must  be viewed  as mutually
exclusive  and  that  once  the  move  to implement  a new  market  has  begun,  no  further  IPP
contracts  should  be  entered  into.  In  many  countries,  there  is a chronic  lack of generating
capacity,  system reliability is poor  and  demand  is growing  rapidly.  In  these  circumstances,
it is not  realistic to expect  investors  to enter into  commitments  to accept  full market  risk at
a  time  when  the  new  market  is still in  the  course  of  design  yet  new  capacity  is urgently
required  to avoid power  crises.  It is also unrealistic  to expect investors  to take market  risk
in  the  early stages  of  market  operation  when  design  flaws may  need  correction  and  the
market  operator  and  other participants  are still learning the rules  of the game.
A  key  transitional  issue  is one  of  how  to attract  necessary  new investment  in generation
until  the market  is fully established.  IPP  contracts  may well provide  an  appropriate  answer
in the minimum  amount  of  time.  The  question  is how  they  should  be  structured  in order
to ease integration.
Ancillay  Services and Congestion Management
Most  existing IPP  contracts  contain  at best limited  obligations  to provide  ancillary services
and  in  no  event  pay  the  producer  for  providing  them.  Restructured  markets  unbundle
ancillary  services  and  producers  who  provide  such  services  are  paid  for  them.37 At  least
some  of the revenues  which  could  be seen at risk for an IPP  in a competitive  market  could
be  recovered  through  the  sale of  ancillary  services.  For  example,  market  rules  create  a
separate  ancillary  services  market  which  is  designed  to  incentivize  market  participants
(generators  in  particular)  to  support  the  system  operator  in  maintaining  reliability  and
security  of  supply.  The  ancillary  services  will  include  frequency  and  voltage  control,
reactive  power,  reserves  and  black start  capability.  If the IPP  plant  has, for example,  black
start capability, it would  be separately compensated  for making it available.
In  less  developed  countries  where  reliability  is  a  serious  problem,  paying  generators  to
provide  ancillary  services  represents  a  small price  to  pay  for an  enormous  saving  in  the
costs  of attempting  to maintain  some  measure  of  system  security and  continuity  of  supply
through  crisis management.  The benefits  to the  consumer  and  to the economy  in terms  of
improved  quality and  continuity  of  service  are considerable.  Not  only would  the  contract
holder/power  purchaser  gain  but  so  would  the  IPP.  The  IPP  would  be  paid  for  a
capability  which  may  always have  been  inherent  in its  plant  but  which  it has  never  been
asked  to provide  or  been  paid  for in  the  past.  If market  based pricing  is a feature  of  the
ancillary  services  market  and  the  IPP  develops  the  appropriate  trading  and  operational
skills, it should  be able to ensure  that its plant is able to provide  the  ancillary services at the
times when prices in the market  are high.
There  may  also  be  an  opportunity  for  the  IPP  to  make  money  under  congestion
management  arrangements.  The  market  rules  may  well  involve  payments  to  generators
who  are prepared  to increase  or decrease  their  generation  in order  to alleviate transmission
system congestion.  The  prices paid  may be  bid based  or they may be  calculated  according
to some other  formula involving  opportunity  cost.
37 The  rates  may be based  on competitively  procured  contracts  (as  in the early  England  and Wales  Pool)  or
spot  prices  bid competitively,  or a combination  of the two (as  in California).
-24-Evolution  to Merchant  Plant  Status
Until a power market has been well-established  in a country, it will be difficult to attract
investors to finance merchant plants that carry full market risk. One approach is to reduce
the period of time during which the IPP is completely insulated from the market.  There
are at least two potential ways of doing this.  First, instead of a capacity price fixed for
twenty-five years, the price could be fixed for a shorter period of time, for example, five
years.  After that, the developer would take additional market risk each year. For example,
the developer may take 20% market risk in year 6, 40% in year 7, and so on  until the
contract is completely at market.  Second, bidders for new capacity can be required to
submit bids.  based on a five-year,  ten-year,  and twenty-five  year contract term.
While these approaches have appeal, there is a danger that the most likely  response would
be to bid the same net present value of the fixed price income stream, but for shorter
periods of time.  In any  event, investors will require considerable confidence that  the
reform and the new market will be very well designed and implemented. They will want to
be  assured that  prices cannot be  manipulated to  their disadvantage through  abuse of
market power  and that there is a first class governance mechanism to ensure that the right
corrections are made in the light of operating experience.
Synmmetry.in  Buyout  and  Termination  Clauses
Where a  PPA is concluded in  circumstances where a  restructuring is in  the course of
implementation, the parties will inevitably focus on  the buyout and  termination clauses
because  of  the  uncertainties  that  the  future holds.  Traditional  buyout  clauses  have
compensated the  developer for  the unamortized portion  of the  future revenue stream
Under the typical buyout formula, the above-market portion of the contract is reduced to a
present-valued lump  sum with  the  developer being isolated from  market risk and  the
purchaser being completely exposed.
The buyout clause should ideally be symmetrical,  so that if the IPP developer thinks it can
do  better in the market than under the contract, it must pay the contract holder/power
purchaser for terminating the contract and depriving the purchaser of the benefit of the
bargain.  The difficulty is that prior to the opening of the market it is not easy to craft a
buyout formula acceptable to both parties based on  anticipated market prices. A  simple
solution might be to maintain tracking accounts to establish the amount of money, which
the IPP would have or has made in the market against that to which it is entitled under the
PPA.  The parties could simply split the surplus proceeds between them on a 50/50 basis.
This would be carried out on  an ex-post basis rather than on the basis of the projected
market price mentioned earlier.  Although the contract would not change financially,  the
presence of the IPP generation would enhance the liquidity of the market.
Specifi  Considerations
Choice of Successor  Contract Holder/Power  Purchaser
If the IPP contracts are not to be the subject of a contract buyout, it will be necessary to
determine which of the new successor entities to the vertically  integrated utility would be
-25 -the most appropriate contract holder/power purchaser.  This decision  involves focusing on
the various finctions of the contract holder under the PPA and contract manager. 38
As explained earlier, the contract holder is the contract party to the PPA, responsible for
the performance of the obligations to the IPP  (particularly  funding payments and would
also be responsible for the performance of the contract manager).  The contract manager
would  act  as intermediary between  the IPP  and  the  ISO  and/or  market  coordinator
(sometimes  termed  settlement  agent),  responsible  for  the  day-to-day  functions  and
activities arising under  the market rules and  the terms of the PPA.  It would also be a
marketer or retailer of the IPP output under the PPA. If the contract manager is organized
as a profit making entity, it could be incentivized to minimize above-market costs and to
look for solutions that would result in voluntary renegotiation of the IPP contracts in a
manner that is mutually satisfactory to the parties. The incentives could include the ability
to  share an agreed percentage of cost  savings, to keep savings achieved that are greater
than  a  specified target or bonus for  designing a  formula acceptable to  the parties that
achieves some degree of market integration.
Evaluation of Potential Candidates
The  main  concern  that  arises in relation to  the  selection of a  successor to  the utility
offtaker is the potential for the creation of conflicts of interest and whether they could be
dealt with effectively through regulation to preserve the transparency and integrity of the
market.  The ISO  is ruled out on  this basis as it should operate independently of any
trading in the marketplace.  Similar concerns arise with the transmission company and a
distribution company, which must  provide  open  and  non-discriminatory access to its
system. A generator would be a potential competitor of the IPP and may, therefore, have a
conflict of interest.  An independent electricity retailer could be an appropriate candidate
for either role.  An independent, profit-motivated39  company, established for this purpose
would be ideal.
In  Ontario, the  residual, debt  service successor company was chosen to  be  the power
purchaser/contract  holder.  Its  primary role was to manage and minimize the stranded
costs  associated with  Ontario  Hydro's  considerable debt  as well as  to  manage above
markets costs associated with its 100 NUG contracts.  It was free of any conflict of interest
which would affect the transparency and credibility of the market.  However, it did not
have  the  necessary market  skills to  be  the  contract  manager and  would  have had  to
outsource this function in any event.  The role of contract manager requires real profit-
motivation to enable incentives  to be created to manage the contracts effectively  to achieve
IPP plant integration and to minimize above market costs.
Quantifying  and RecoverngAbove-Market  Costs
ReducingAbove-Market  Costs
The above-market costs arising from the pressure of competitive forces on  existing plant
represent  a  major challenge to  the  achievement of the goals of introducing wholesale
power markets. Such costs must be borne by some combination of IPP generators, their
38 The analysis  gave rise to the virtual generation/managed contract approach utilised in Victoria and
proposed for Ontario and Thailand.
39 Profit-motivation is useful for the creation of performance incentives.
- 26  -financiers, off takers, taxpayers and consumers. The reluctance of any group to bear what
they perceive to be a disproportionate share of costs, particularly  given the uncertainties in
the evolution of a new power market, place a premium on creating devices to minimize
above-market costs.  Very few jurisdictions have attempted to  do this either by adapting
market rules appropriately or by incentivizing a contract manager to do  so.  They have
simply established a  mechanism to  recover  such  costs, typically involving a  levy  on
consumers. The cost-recovery  mechanism generally  requires
*  quantification; and
*  measures to moderate the impact on those who pay the costs.
This issue was a  particularly sensitive one in Ontario, where  Ontario  Hydro's level of
stranded debt  was already extremely high and  the very significant above-market cost
recovery period associated with the NUG  contracts could extend for  the lives of those
contracts  and  beyond  the  cost  recovery  period  associated with  the  stranded  debt.
Interestingly, this concern began to  evaporate when  it was realized that the longer the
period of recovery, the smaller the  levy that the consumer would have to pay on a regular
basis.
Measurig  Above Market Costs
Present value approach: One approach to quantification  is the "present value" approach
in which above-market costs are calculated as the difference between the net present value
of the average contract price and the current market price. However, this approach suffers
from a major drawback in that it makes no room for movements in the market prices over
the life of the asset.  In short, the above-market cost of a long-term IPP power is not the
same over time.  It will fluctuate based upon movement of the variables that contribute
towards its calculation,  the most important of those variables  being the market price itself.
Because the level of stranded costs varies inversely with the market price of power, and
because the levels of predicted stranded costs can be staggering (in the entire US, total
stranded  costs  were, at  one  time, estimated to  be  above $200  billion), stranded cost
recovery needs to be trued-up, periodically,  to actual prices in the power market. Increased
market prices contribute to this reduction in above-market cost.  It would be viewed as
inequitable  to  overcharge  consumers  and  politically unacceptable  to  be  seen  to  be
reimbursing them any over- payment.  The periodic reviews do however carry  costs  and
may be subject to disputes.
Rebidding  contracted capacity:  If  there  is  a  contract buyout  under  a  competitive
process, the above-market costs would be crystallized in a more  accurate way than the
"'present value" approach. Under the crystallization  approach, the price that is offered by
the successful bidder would form the basis for the calculation of the above- market costs4o.
The advantage that this approach presents  over the "present value" approach is that by
definition, the value of the plant would be assessed based on market participants' (bidders)
expectations as to future prices.
Where the above-market costs are crystallized  in this way, these costs could be funded by
raising necessary debt  and  securitizing that  debt  against future revenue  streams  from
40  The crystallised  above-rnarket  costs  would essentially  be the difference  between  the net present  value  of the
average  contract  price  and the price  paid by the successful  bidder.
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the costs of transitioning to a competitive wholesale power market.  The latter approach
would  take  the  form  of  a  reduced  value  of  contract  holder  assets  in  the  case  of
privatization/divestiture or compensatory payments to contract holders if no  acquisition
was contemplated.  If the stream of revenue from consumers or tax payers was reasonably
certain (eg. captive consumers), securitization  may reduce the financing costs.
However, as already indicated, an immediate buyout at  the time of introduction of the
competitive market may place a high premium on the market risk that the new contract
holder would be required to assume and, as such, may not have the full impact on reducing
above-market costs.  Once the market is reasonably developed, perceptions of market risk
will be reduced and prospective buyers will be in a better position to quantify and assess it.
Real time valuation  of differences:  A third option is to determine the above-market
costs in real time.  In other words, the amount could be determined every hour of the day
based upon the difference between the IPP contract prices and the price actually received
for the power supplied by the IPPs in the wholesale market.  Some forecasting would be
required because certain of the amounts payable to  the IPPs under  their contracts (for
example, the capacity payment) is calculated after the month to which any given payment
relates.  The implementation of this  system requires detailed information  to  be  made
available  to the market operator.
PooQng Stranded Costs
Once above-market costs have been quantified, they might be pooled  with other stranded
costs4 1. TiMs  would  permit  reductions  in costs if  one  stream  of  stranded  costs  experiences
unexpectedly  favorable trends, resulting in stranded benefits rather than stranded costs, and
the  two  could be  offset  against each other.  "Stranded benefits"  tend  to  arise when
revisions  in cashflow projections result in "excess" revenues beyond those required to meet
all of the stranded costs.  Pooling would help ensure that stranded benefits from whatever
source would reduce the nominal above-market  costs to be recovered from the consumers
or taxpayers.
Recovery  TArough  Transmission  Tariff
Above-market costs may also be recovered through a levy added to the transmission tariff.
In this situation, the transmission company acts as collection agent.  The calculation could
be carried out by the contract holder/manager  or the transmission company if it is given
the necessary data. This approach suffers from several disadvantages. For example, it does
not provide for transparency.  Consumers would not be able to identify the above-market
costs of the IPP contracts as a separate component in their bill.  It would also introduce a
measure of volatility into the transmission tariff based on  the IPP's performance, which
would be confusing to market participants and consumers.  If it were applied to wheeling
transactions by  purchasers  connected  to  neighboring (interconnected) transmission or
distribution systems outside the transmission systems of the new market, it would result in
charging the associated external buyers or sellers, who  should not be burdened  by the
above-market costs (because they were not involved in their creation and did not benefit
41 Examples  of other stranded  costs  include  the outstanding  debt of the vertically  integrated  utility  that is
being  restructured,  which  may be publicly  held (e.g.  by bondholders)  or above-market  costs  associated  with
utility's  own generating  plant  which  is not competitive  with other  plant  in the market.
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who  wish to export electricity outside  their jurisdiction.
On  the  other  hand,  there  are certain  advantages.  For  example,  it is the  mechanism  that is
least  open  to by-pass.  In  other words,  a consumer  cannot  avoid paying the levy because all
consumers  will be  paying, directly or  indirecdy,  an  amount  in respect  of  their  use  of  the
transmission  system. 42 Moreover,  it does  not  upset  competitive  relationships.  The  other
advantage  is that  it should  be  relatively  easy to  collect  through  the  ISO  or  transmission
company,  without  irnposing  excessive administration  costs.
Approaches in Developing Country Contexts
The  goal of most  countries  in integrating  IPPs  into electricity markets  center  on:
*  creating  a liquid, efficient  and competitive  market;
*  minimizing  above-market  costs  associated  with  IPP  contracts  and  their  impact  on  the
consumer.
However,  the  initial  conditions  of  developed  and  less  developed  countries  often  differ.
The  typical features in developing  countries  are:-
*  strong  demand  growth;
*  backlog  of under-investment;
*  low retail tariffs that  are not  cost-reflective;
*  lack of financial resources  (including  currency risk, lack of liquidity);
*  exceptionally  high institutional,  political  and regulatory  risk.
This  will mean  that  the  steps  on  the  way to reform  may have  to be  taken  more  gradually
and  the  design  of  the  market  should,  at  least  initially, be  relatively less  complex  than  in
some  developed  countries.
Choice  ofApproach  for Developing  Countries
A  developing  country  should  begin  by  taking  positive  steps  to  make  it  clear  to  all
stakeholders  and potential  investors  that  the reform  will be well designed  and implemented
and  that  their  concerns  will be addressed.  If there  is no  confidence  that  the government  is
serious  about  doing  the job properly  it will lose credibility.
The  most  challenging  scenario  for any developing  country is where  there  is strong  demand
growth,  an urgent  need  to attract  new investment  and  existing IPP  plant  that  represents  a
significant  proportion  of the  more  flexible, efficient  and  cheaper  capacity  on its system.  It
would  clearly  be  desirable to integrate  the IPP  plant into  the market.  The solution,  in this
scenario,  could involve  a combination  of approaches:
42 It might be that the market design would allow market participants embedded in a distribution system
which purchase only from an embedded generator to avoid paying transmission charges.  However, there are
relatively few examples where the design does allow for this.  If it does, a special rule would have to be
created to avoid by-pass of a stranded cost levy included in transmission charges.
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at  least  with  respect  to  uncontracted  capacity  and  energy  and  also  ancilUary
services  and congestion  management;
(b)  adapt  the  market  rules  preferably  for  a transitional  period  to  accommodate  the
IPPs  to  the  extent  possible  without  compromising  the  competitiveness  and
efficiency  of  the market  and  exempt  them  from  the  requirements  to  comply with
rules  and  standards  which  do not  affect  reliability, particularly  if these  have  cost
implications;
(c)  appoint  an experienced  and  skilled contract  manager  to manage  the  PPAs  for the
power  purchaser/contract  holder,  but  one  which  is  incentivized  to  facilitate
integration  and minimize  above-market  costs;
(d)  consider  the potential  benefits  of  a contract  buyout  at  a point  in the  future,  once
the  market  has  settled  down,  on  the  expectation  that  there  will  be  sufficient
interest  from  suitably  qualified  bidders  prepared  to  take  a  substantial  degree  of
market  risk without  discounting  the prices they are prepared  to bid excessively;
(e)  establish  a  transparent  and  credible  process  of  discussion  and  consultation  with
IPPs  in relation  to  the  measures  outlined  in  (a) - (d) above; in  order  to  reassure
IPPs, their  lenders  and investors.
Conclusions
Development  of the Ideas and Solutions
This paper  outlines  a range  of issues and  options  to  ease the integration  of  IPPs  into  new
electricity  markets.  More  work  is needed  to  develop  practicable  strategies  based  on in-
depth  evaluation  of experience  to date in specific  country circumstances.  Among  the most
salient topics are:-
*  Assessment  of  operational  experience,  including  quantification  of financial  outcomes  in
those  countries  that  have  attempted  to  deal with  IPPs  to  achieve  market  integration
and/or  minimize  above-market  costs;
*  Case  studies  of  financial  and  operational  implications  for  countries  which  have  a
significant proportion  of IPP  plant on  the system and which  have not  dealt with  market
integration  or  above-market  costs;
*  Specification  and  modeling  of  alternative  market  rules  to  accommodate  IPPs  on  a
transitional  or long term basis;
*  On  case  study  basis,  identify  and  evaluate  tradeoffs/synergies  between  good  grid
management  and  market  liquidity with specific  transitional  provisions  in IPP  contracts
designed to ease integration  into  new markets;
*  Elaboration  of  facilitation  processes  to  achieve  the successful  outcome  of  a voluntary
renegotiation  of IPP  contracts;
*  Quantitative  evaluation  of  the  distributional  impact  of  various  options  on  key
stakeholders:  IPP  shareholders,  offtakers,  taxpayers, and  consumers.
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In  tackling the  integration  of  IPP  contracts  into  power  markets,  governments  and
regulators must  command  credibility with  the IPPs,  their lenders, investors  and  other
market participants.  Experience to date strongly indicates that unless IPPs are convinced
that  the issues  will be  handled in a  fair and  transparent  manner,  they will refuse  to
cooperate in integrating or  renegotiating their contracts.
This places the onus on governments and regulators to implement a well thought through
communications strategy and manage a process that is perceived to be fair, transparent and
open, consulting affected stakeholders from the start.  They must develop the reputation,
through their actions, for being fair but firm.  This will require that they equip themselves
with the appropriate knowledge and expertise.
Equally important is sound design of market structures and rules. Manipulating the design
to accommodate the fears or pre-occupations of a particular stakeholder group, industry
incumbent  or  a political dogma will not produce  a market  that is workable or  which
provides a level playing field for the forces of competition to achieve efficiency gains and
drive down costs/prices for the benefit of the consumer.
From  the perspective of the consumer, it must be worth  making the effort to integrate
IPPs into new markets and to minimize the associated above-market costs.  Indeed, partial
integration will be better  than  nothing e.g. participation in ancillary services markets or
congestion management measures even if IPP  energy is not initially traded in the new
market.  However, there may be scope for trading uncontracted capacity and energy if the
quantity is significant.
It clearly  is in the realm of the possible to change some of the variables referred to in this
note  even if re-negotiation of the IPP contracts themselves proves to  be difficult, e.g.,
changing market rules to facilitate  integration over time and appointing a contract manager,
incentivized to minimize the above-market costs.  These measures, however modest will, in
the long run benefit the consumer and the economy at large.
Ultimately,  integrating IPPs into markets is a transitional issue.  The time will come when
the market is sufficiendy  stable that IPPs will participate in it on their own volition and take
increasing market risk.  Other  market participants will then be willing to buy out the IPP
contracts or plant  at prices that minimnize  above-market costs.  The question of existing
IPP contracts should not be allowed to deter the market reforms. There are a number of
potential  solutions  to  be  created  through  modification  of  market  rules,  contract
management  arrangements,  and  IPP  contractual  obligations  and  remunerations.
Governments must make a sustained, concerted effort to deal with the issues and to treat
the parties fairly.  The payoff to  the country involved is  realizing significantly greater
productive and allocative  efficiencies.
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- 32-Annex  1
International  Experience  of Integrating  IPPs  into Electricity  Markets
(a)  California has  a significant quantity  of IPP  and QF plant  43.  Most of it was
contracted  to  the  three  large  investor-owned  utilities  who,  as  purchasers,  were
simply  required  by  the  regulatory  regime  to  bid  that  capacity  and  the  energy
produced  into  the  new  Power  Exchange  (PX).  The  distributors  that  purchased
through  the  PX  were  permitted  to  pass  these  wholesale  costs  on  to  their
customers  (although  they were  also subject  to an initial rate  freeze).  Also,  certain
exemptions  were  incorporated  into  the  market  rules  to  accommodated  some  of
the  IPP  and  QF  plant  which  the  regulators  designated  as  "must  take"  plant.
Accordingly,  while  the  QFs  are integrated  into  the  market,  in  that  their  power  is
accepted,  they  are  not  economically  integrated.  If  their  contracts  are  inflexible,
the  plants  are  not  dispatchable.  In  sum,  the  market  merely  accommodates  the
QFs rather  than  integrating  them.
(b)  Victoria  implemented  a successful  reform  program  and  market  structure  (based
on  the  England  and  Wales  model)  and  assigned  each  of  the  PPAs  entered  into
with IPPs  to one  of four 'TPA  Traders"  which  resold  the output  of  the IPP  plant
in the market.  This is described  more  fully in the main  text of this paper.
(c)  Northern  Ireland  put  in  place  the  single  buyer  model  and  sold  its  existing
generating  plant  to  three  IPPs  which  sell power  to the  single  buyer  (a combined
wholesale  purchaser/bulk  supplier,  transmission  and  distribution  company)  under
15  year  PPAs.  The  regulator  has  been  anxious  to  introduce  more  wholesale
competition.  A  mechanism  has  been  introduced  where  wholesale  buyers  can
purchase  surplus  capacity  directly  from  the  IPPs  as  "virtual  generation"  and  sell
the  energy  to non-captive,  large customers.  This  has  involved  intensive  but  not
very productive,  renegotiation  of some very sophisticated,  long  term PPAs.
(d)  Portugal  has  two new  large IPP  plants  on its  system accounting  for  around  35-
40%  of its capacity which  recently  came into service.  They are  cheaper  and  more
efficient  than  any of the other  plant.  In  1993, it designed its reform  process  and  a
single buyer  market  structure  around  these  IPPs.  The  plant  is fully dispatchable
and  must  provide  ancillary  services  and  congestion  management  measures44.  In
response  to  concerns  from  the  European  Union  competition  authority  that  the
model  was  not  competitive  because  all  of  the  IPP  and  existing  plant  was
contracted  to  the  single  buyer,  the  Portuguese  created  a  second  "free  market"
along  side the  single buyer "binding"  market  in which  IPPs  could  build plant  and
sell to a category  of  large customers  eligible to  choose  their  producer.  So far  no
43  The QF PPAs  were based  on high  prices  set  adrninistratively  and without  regard  to the need for capacity  or
energy.
"These requirements  may  make  it easier  for the contract  holder/power  purchaser  to comply  with the market
rules  but not to renegotiate  the PPAs  or incentivize  the IPPs to take  market  risk.
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The  Portuguese  Government  has  recently  announced  plans  to  reform  this
structure.
(e)  Guatemala  commenced  a  program  to  restructure  and  privatize  its  electricity
industry  between  1997-1999 . Though  it is a small country,  it had  I1  IPPs  on its
system,  protected  by first  generation  power  purchase  agreements  which  did  not
reflect  the  power  purchaser's  role  as  system  operator.  Many  of  the  IPPs  were
financed  by foreign investors  and lenders.
Although  the  legislation and  regulatory  regime purported  to require  integration  of
all plant  connected  to  the  Guatemalan  transmission  system  to participate  in the
new market,  the IPPs  chose  to rest  on the  protections  afforded  to  them  by their
power  purchase  and  other  agreements.  The  government,  regulator  and  power
purchasers  wished  to adopt  an  approach  under  which  they would  look  for "win-
win"  solutions  that would  encourage  the  IPPs  to participate  in the market,  at least
in part.
No  actual  or  implied  coercion  by  the  government,  the  regulator  or  the  power
purchasers/contract  holders  was intended.  However,  the  IPPs  were  alarmed  by
the  prospect  of  contract  renegotiation  and  it has  so  far  not  proved  possible  to
entice  them  to the negotiating  table.
(f)  Poland  is proposing  to  put  in place  a  stranded  cost  recovery  mechanism  which
will cover  the  above-market  costs of IPP  plants  as well other  stranded  costs.  The
other  stranded  costs  comprised  long-term  contracts  for  about  70%  of  Poland's
capacity  and  are related  to investments  made  by state-owned  power  companies  in
equipment  designed  to  reduce  emissions  to  meet  environmental  requirements.
The  recovery  mechanism  involves  an  additional  charge  or  levy  being  made
through  the  transmission  tariff,  payable  by all distributors  and  other  transmission
users.  While  there  has  been  no  attempt  at this  stage to put  in place  mechanisms
that  are  designed  to  encourage  or  facilitate  integration  of  IPP  plant  into  the
planned  wholesale  market,  there  are  indications  that  Poland  will look  to  PPA
renegotiation  to  reduce  stranded  costs.  IPPs  with  more  efficient  plant  already
recognize  that  they will probably  want  to participate  in the new wholesale  market
at  a  relatively  early  stage  once  the  market  has  settled  down  and  are  already
planning  for this.
Because  there  is little experience  of countries  being proactive  and it is not possible  to assess
and  compare  the  outcomes  of  those  countries  that  have  attempted  to  integrate  IPPs  into
the markets  using different  techniques.  Of  the countries  mentioned  in this paper  that have
made  the attempt:
(i)  Victoria  probably  is  the  most  successful  but  there  is  no  cost-benefit  analysis
available to indicate what  the  consumer  has gained or lost;
(ii)  Portugal  has  created  a market  structure  that  integrates  its  IPPs  in a  single-buyer
model  that is not regarded  as particularly  competitive;  and
45 A similar regime exists in Panama.
- 34 -(iii)  Northem  Ireland  has  found  it nearly but  not  quite impossible  to  achieve  more
competition  in the single-buyer model that it has implemented.
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Modification  of Market  Rules
Analysis  of  the  Gap  Between  Relevant  Market  Rules  and
Typical  PPA/Rules/Provisions
1st  2nd
Rule/Provision/Requirement  Generation  Generation  Market
PPA  PPA  Rules
1.  Planning  information/studies  x  X
2.  Operational  information/security x  x
assessments/studies
3.  Operational  requirements  (e.g.  x  _
staffing,  sychronisation)
4.  Plant  data  registration  V  V
5.  Connection/interconnection  v/  V
facilities  and procedures
6.  Availability  declarations/bidding  VI/
7.  Scheduling  procedures  x  X
8.  Temporary revisions to  dynamic x  /
parameters/operational  capabilities
9.  Dispatch  procedures  x .
10. Ancillary  services  (including  reserve x  Vt
and frequent  control)
11. Congestion  management  x  X  V/
12. Incentives/payments for  ancillary x  x  v
services/congestion  management
13. Outage  planning  and coordination  x  vi  /
14. Testing and  monitoring operating  x  /V/
charactertistics,  connection  facilities,
availability,  provision of  ancillary
services
15. Communication  facilities  and  xV
procedures
16. Metering  x  V
17. Negative power  margins (output  x  x  V
reduction  priorities)
18. Operational  liaison,  events,  incidents  x  x
19. Emergencies  and  contingency x
-36 -Ist  2nd
Rule/Provision/Requirement  Generation  Generation  Market
PPA  PPA  Rules
planning
20.  Safety coordination  x  X  /
21.  Disconnection  x  x  /
22.  Consequences  of  non-  /i  /i  /
compliance/liability
23.  Confidentiality  /2  /2  /
24.  Force majeure  /2  /2  /
25.  Audit  x  x/
26.  Dispute resolution  v/2  /2
27.  Prices,  settlements  and billing  //2
28.  Prudential  requirements  (payment  x  x
default protection)
Notes:  1.  Provisions  likely to be considerably  less detailed or demanding.
2.  Provisions  likely to be inconsistent  with market  rules.
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